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A B S T R A C T
Neoclassical economic interpretations of Payment for Environmental Services (PES), which assume that parti-
cipants weigh up costs and beneﬁts, are making room for more complex analyses. However, there is still little
evidence of how PES programmes interact with existing motivations to conserve, the extent to which funded
conservation is additional, and the likely permanence of changes. We categorized the outcome of contracts
aiming to reduce cattle grazing in riparian forest (n=428) and deforestation (n=912) by Bolivian farmers in
terms of whether they were unsuitable, non-compliant, non-additional, or additional (the holy grail of PES
programmes) and explored the relationship between farmers' reported motivations and the extent to which the
conservation funded was additional. Up to 39% of contracts to exclude cattle, and 14% to prevent deforestation
appear to be additional. Where participation is motivated by the instrumental values of nature (such as provision
of clean water) contracts to exclude cattle from riparian forest are more likely to represent additional con-
servation. We suggest that the programme is partly acting as what we term ‘payment for environmental self-
service’; i.e. the external incentives enable changes in behaviour motivated by farmers' perceptions of en-
vironmental beneﬁts they receive from the management changes incentivized.
1. Introduction
Payments for Environmental Services (or the equivalent term
Payment for Ecosystem Services; Wunder, 2015) (PES) have been pre-
sented as an eﬃcient and eﬀective approach to conservation (Engel and
Palmer, 2008; Wunder et al., 2008) and are widely promoted and im-
plemented (Ezzine-de-Blas et al., 2016; Grima et al., 2016). However
there has been growing criticism that such market-mechanisms for
conservation can result in unhelpful commodiﬁcation of nature and can
lead to crowding-out of existing motivations to conserve (Bowles, 2008;
Rode et al., 2015). These criticisms have resulted in increasing aca-
demic interest in land users' motivations to participate in conservation
programmes and the role that conditional positive incentives such as
those provided by PES programmes can play (Moros et al., 2017;
Muradian et al., 2010). Researchers have long been concerned about
the additionality of conservation funded through PES (Pattanayak et al.,
2010; Sánchez-Azofeifa et al., 2007) and there is evidence that many
programmes pay for conservation that would have happened anyway
rather than incentivizing real change in land use (Börner et al., 2017;
Daniels et al., 2010; García-Amado et al., 2013). Where changes are
made, there are concerns about the permanence of such changes after
the programme ends (Engel et al., 2008; Pagiola et al., 2016; Tacconi
et al., 2013; Börner et al., 2017). Despite interest in motivations to
participate in PES and awareness of the importance of additionality and
permanence to PES eﬀectiveness, there is little research explicitly
linking the motivation of those participating in a PES programme and
the additionality or permanence of the conservation funded.
The factors inﬂuencing household participation in a PES project
were ﬁrst considered in detail by Pagiola and colleagues in 2005. Their
model (Pagiola et al., 2005) emphasises that for a household to parti-
cipate they must ﬁrst be eligible (for example by owning land which
meets the PES criteria), they must want to participate (which the au-
thors assume is primarily based on the proﬁtability of the PES pro-
gramme), and they must be able to participate (which will be aﬀected
by factors such as their level of experience and the technical diﬃculty
of the practices which PES seeks to incentivize). However as the way
PES is conceptualized has shifted from its initial roots in neoclassical
economics to more explicitly acknowledging the importance of the
social context of decisions to participate (Gómez-Baggethun et al.,
2009; McAfee and Shapiro, 2010; Muradian et al., 2010); motivation
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deserves a central role in the model explaining participation in PES
(Fig. 1). Motivation can be deﬁned as ‘to be moved to do something’
(Ryan and Deci, 2000). The literature demonstrates that while pay-
ments do play a role in motivating behaviour change in PES, pro-social
and pro-nature motivations are also important (Rode et al., 2015).
Pro-social motivations include possible gains in social capital
through cooperation with others (García-Amado et al., 2013) and there
is evidence that these inﬂuence people's willingness to engage with
conservation (D'Adda, 2011). People may also be motivated to join a
programme due to the prevailing rules or social norms (Corbera et al.,
2009; Vatn, 2010). For example; once participants have signed up to a
PES, the rules which underpin the contract may be part of the moti-
vation to comply and enact the conservation (Kolinjivadi et al., 2014).
Pro-nature motivations include those based both on the instrumental
and non-instrumental values of nature (Rode et al., 2015). People may
participate in a PES programme because of perceived instrumental
beneﬁts they may receive from the environmental services (whether
provisioning, supporting, regulating or cultural services) now or in the
future (bequest value; Fisher, 2012; García-Amado et al., 2013). For
example, farmers in a PES programme in Colombia were more willing
to participate if they perceived long term environmental beneﬁts to
themselves (Hayes, 2012). Finally, some people will participate because
they have a moral commitment to nature conservation or value the very
existence of the relevant ecosystem (Kenter et al., 2015; Luck et al.,
2012; Muradian, 2013; Van Hecken and Bastianensen, 2010); such
motivations are based on non-instrumental values of nature (Fig. 1).
Payments for Watershed Services are a category of PES programmes
that involve a relationship between multiple users of the same wa-
tershed. Payment for watershed services programmes were initially
conceptualized as downstream users incentivising sustainable land use
practices upstream to secure their access to water quality and quantity
(Wunder and Albán, 2008). In practice, payments for watershed ser-
vices are very diverse, embedded in institutional relations among
multiple private and public stakeholders, and use a range of ﬁnancial
and non-ﬁnancial incentives (Boisvert et al., 2013; Martin-Ortega et al.,
2013). In 2003, a Bolivian NGO, Fundación Natura Bolivia (Natura),
launched a form of Payment for Watershed Services in the Bolivian
highlands to establish reciprocal relationships between environmental
service users (Municipal Governments, Water Cooperatives and inter-
national donors) and upstream farmers and cattle-owners (Asquith
et al., 2008). The programme, now known as Watershared, has never
used the terminology of market transactions but refers to the contracts
as Reciprocal Watershed Agreements (Acuerdos Reciprocos por Agua).
Watershared aims to conserve biodiversity and improve water quality by
incentivising farmers to prevent forest conversion and exclude cattle
from riparian forest. > 210,000 ha belonging to 4500 families are
under Watershared agreements (Asquith, 2016).
We evaluate the role played by diﬀerent categories of motivation
(motivation based on payments, pro-social motivations, and motiva-
tions based on pro-nature instrumental and pro-nature non-instru-
mental values) in incentivizing farmers' participation in Watershared,
the extent to which farmers acting on diﬀerent reported motivations
provide additional conservation, and the likely permanence of this
conservation when contracts expire. We argue that the programme is
partly acting as what we term ‘payment for environmental self-service’
in that the external incentives enable changes in behaviour motivated
by farmers' perceptions of environmental beneﬁts they and their com-
munity receive from the management changes incentivized. In other
words, pro-nature instrumental motivations are important in moti-
vating behaviour change.
2. Methods
2.1. Description of the Study Site
The Rio Grande catchment in the eastern Bolivian Andes covers
57′000 km2. Although the area has quite high average rainfall (nearly
900mm across the area), water is a limiting factor for agriculture in the
dry season. Most people rely on unimproved water sources often taken
from outtakes in the forest. In order to protect the watershed, and also
the local forests which are highly biodiverse (Myers et al., 2000) the
Santa Cruz government created the Río Grande Valles Cruceños Natural
Integrated Management Area (Spanish acronym ANMI-VG-RC) in 2007
(Decree N°059/07). In 2011, a local NGO, Fundación Natura Bolivia
(Natura), started to apply the Watershared programme in the area
(Fig. 2).
The Watershared programme provides in kind incentives (a free
choice of beehives, fruit seedlings, irrigation tubing, construction ma-
terial, and barbed wire) to upstream farmers who commit to following
certain land use restrictions on contracted land. There are three levels
of contract which vary in terms of what land is eligible and what re-
strictions are placed on land owners (see summary in the appendix A).
For a level 1 contract (which covers only forested land, within 100m of
a river), farmers receive 100 USD worth of in-kind incentives (at market
value) at signing plus $10 worth per hectare annually. No cultivation is
permitted within the contracted area and cattle must be excluded. Level
Fig. 1. Conceptual framework highlighting the factors inﬂuencing participation in a PES programme (based on Pagiola et al., 2005) with particular focus on the role
of diﬀerent categories of motivation.
(Adapted form Rode et al., 2015).
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two contracts apply on similar land to level 1 and also require no
clearance but farmers are not required to remove cattle immediately.
The payment is 3 USD per hectares. Level 3 contracts apply to forested
and shrub land not along the banks of rivers. While clearance for cul-
tivation is forbidden, cattle rearing is acceptable. The payment is 1 USD
per hectare. Contracts are for three years but are renewable. An earlier
study (Grillos, 2017) investigated uptake of the programme by farmers
in the area, concluding that social factors, as well as barriers to entry,
may have inﬂuenced take-up. Funding for the incentives comes from a
combination of local municipalities, payments by water users into
water funds, and Natura's international donors.
Natura conduct annual monitoring of each parcel under level 1 or
level 2 and record signs of the presence of cows or clearance to verify
farmers' compliance (Natura, 2014). Level 3 contracts are monitored
using remote sensing. Extreme cases of non-compliance have resulted in
the incentives being taken back and redistributed to the community.
2.2. Data Collection
We worked in the 81 communities in which Watershared has been
implemented since 2010. These communities vary in size from 1
to> 100 households. We conducted exploratory ﬁeld work in April and
May 2015 to get a comprehensive understanding of local land use dy-
namics and implementation of the programme on the ground. We then
returned between October 2015 and March 2016 to conduct household
surveys. Surveys were conducted in Spanish on Android tablets by 12
trained enumerators using the Open Data Kit software (https://
opendatakit.org/), usually with the household head. PB and DC at-
tended a signiﬁcant sub-set of interviews. Our sampling frame was a
complete list of households in each community prepared by Natura
when they started working in the area in 2010 and included both those
who had enrolled in the programme and those who chose not to
(n=2680). This paper includes data from 507 households who we
Fig. 2. The Río Grande Valles Cruceños Natural Integrated Management Area (Spanish acronym ANMI-RG-VC) and the 67 villages participating in the Watershared
programme.
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interviewed who had enrolled in the programme and therefore had
Watershared contracts on at least one parcel of their land. Households
may have more than one parcel of land under a conservation contract.
The survey included questions about why the household had joined
the programme, the type of incentives they selected and the way the
programme was implemented by detailing the practices of land use
before and during the contract. Detailed questions were asked about all
level 1 parcels the household had under Watershared contracts and, if
this was< 5 contracts, their level 2 and 3. The enumerator had a GIS
map overlaid on google earth open on a tablet computer during the
interview to help focus the discussion on speciﬁc land parcels under
discussion.
The interviews covered details of 912 contracted land parcels be-
longing to the 507 participants. However, owing to some questions left
unanswered, some of our analysis is based on 911 land parcels, and
some on 912. We also conducted key informant interviews with 10
people to estimate the eﬀort expended by farmers to use barbed wire to
fence their land (Fig. B1). The survey instruments (and full data set) are
archived with the UK data archive (Bottazzi et al., 2017).
2.3. Classiﬁcation of Enrolled Parcels
Because all contracts prohibit cultivation (as a signiﬁcant aim of
Watershared is to reduce deforestation), but only level 1 contracts
prohibit cattle grazing, we classiﬁed each parcel for which we have data
(n=912) in terms of cultivation , and only level 1 contracts
(n=428) in terms of cattle exclusion . We classiﬁed each parcel into
one of four ‘additionality’ categories based on the responses by the
household head: unsuitable (a parcel which the farmer did not consider
suitable for cultivation or cattle grazing but which was enrolled in a
contract paying the land owner not to do that activity), non-compliant
(a parcel where cultivation or cattle grazing was carried out against the
rules of the Watershared contract), non-additional (a parcel where cul-
tivation or cattle grazing was not carried out, but where the household
reported they would not have used the parcel in that way even in the
absence of the contract), and additional (a parcel where respondents
reported that in the absence of the contract they would have cultivated
or grazed cattle but they do not because of the Watershared contract).
Only parcels suitable for cattle/grazing could be considered as com-
pliant or non-compliant, and only compliant parcels could be con-
sidered additional or non-additional (Fig. 3). Because we cannot detect
spill-over (land use being displaced from contracted land to other land
which is not under contract; Alix-Garcia et al., 2012), our estimates of
additionality should be considered a maximum value.
We acknowledge that self-reported data on land use has limitations
(respondents may, for example, be unwilling to admit enrolling un-
suitable land in the programme or non-compliance of contracts).
However it would not have been possible to achieve an independent
classiﬁcation of enrolled parcels because detailed local knowledge of
the land, its accessibility, the household economy, are all needed to
classify land as suitable or not and only the household can say what
they would have done in the absence of the contract. Our ﬁeld team
worked hard to emphasise that information provided in the survey was
conﬁdential and there would be no consequences from responses given
in the survey. We do have independent data on non-compliance with
which to compare our survey responses concerning non-compliance
(probably the most sensitive of our questions). The levels of non-com-
pliance reported in our surveys are similar to that detected by Natura
Fig. 3. Outline of model hierarchy showing the number of parcels included for our three sets of models predicting 1) suitability of land enrolled, 2) compliance with
conservation contracts, and 3) additionality of the contracts. Each model is a binomial model where ‘1’ represents the “positive” outcome (suitability, compliance,
and additionality). Models were run separately for cattle grazing (level 1 contracts only) and crops (all contracts). The distribution of motivations reported is shown
for each set of models (classiﬁcation of motivations is: pro-nature non-instrumental , pro-nature instrumental , social and payment ; see Fig. 1).
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technicians during their monitoring (Natura, 2014) giving us con-
ﬁdence. Finally, we would argue that by using self-reported data to
classify land parcels we are identifying the extent to which parcels
under conservation are considered additional by respondents. The
perception of participants in the diﬀerence an intervention has caused
is a valid question for impact evaluators (Woodhouse et al., 2015).
To explore the permanence of conservation funded by the pro-
gramme we asked respondents what a parcel will be used for after the
programme has ﬁnished. The answers included a range of options but
for simplicity these were binned into categories reﬂecting whether the
conservation will be continued or not.
2.4. Ethics and Conﬂict of Interests
This research was assessed under the Bangor University Research
Ethics Framework. There is the potential for conﬂict of interest as
Natura were involved in the research but are also the implementers of
the Watershared programme which is the focus of our research.
However, the survey was designed, managed and the data cleaned and
analysed by the Bangor University team and although enumerators paid
by Natura conducted the bulk of the interviews in the household survey,
they were trained by authors of this paper who have no prior aﬃliation
with Natura.
2.5. Data Analysis
2.5.1. Classiﬁcation of Household Motivation
To explore the relationship between additionality categories and
respondents' motivation we classiﬁed respondents' motivations to join
the programme using the question from the survey “Why did you join
the programme?”. Responses were binned into categories representing
the typology of motivations represented in Fig. 1. These are motivation
arising from the in kind incentives (payment ), pro-social motivations
based on conforming to norms or building social capital (social ),
motivation arising from the perception that conservation can provide
valuable ecosystem services (pro-nature instrumental ), and moti-
vation based on moral values or existence value of nature (pro-nature
non-instrumental ). The question was multiple answer but re-
spondents were also asked for their top motivation.
2.5.2. Approach to Analysis
Models assessing additionality categories of the two main con-
servation objectives of the Watershared contracts (preventing cattle
grazing in riparian forest, and preventing expansion of cultivation)
were constructed for these two outcomes separately since parcels of
land could represent additional conservation for either outcome in-
dependently. Hierarchical logistic models were applied to model ad-
ditionality categories owing to their implicit hierarchical structure
(only a parcel which was suitable could be compliant and only one
which was compliant could be additional).
Some households had a number of parcels of land under conserva-
tion. Therefore, the models (conducted using parcels as the unit of
analysis) had repeated measures as modelling was based on the ques-
tion “Why did you join the programme?” which was asked at household
level. However, owing to the low number of repeats compared to the
full data set (507 households, 911 data points), explicit inclusion in
models was not feasible. Further, out of all households with more than
one contract (240 with a combination of contract levels and 65 with
level 1 contracts only), 175 and 33 respectively had parcels falling into
more than one additionality category, implying a degree of in-
dependence between “repeated” measures.
For the question “Why did you join the programme?”, respondents
both reported multiple-answer data (noting any motivation that applied)
and their top choice of motivation. This presented a number of options
for analysis. Multiple-answer data present a special case of non-in-
dependence in statistics whereby combinations of choices can be more
meaningful than individual choices (Bilder and Loughin, 2014); in our
case, for example, respondents who joined the programme for both
payment and pro-nature instrumental reasons may plausibly have dif-
ferent additionality outcomes to respondents who joined the programme
for payment reasons only. Equally, respondents who chose the same
reasons to join the programme but had diﬀerent top reasons to join may
also plausibly have diﬀerent additionality outcomes. These considera-
tions resulted in three modelling approaches – using all motivations to
join as independent predictors (“ALL”), collapsing all motivations to join
into one factor with all unique combinations of motivations across the
respondents (“MULT”), and using top reason only (“TOP”).
Without a priori expectations as to which out of the three modelling
approaches was most appropriate, we applied all and selected between
models using the Akaike Information Criterion or, where models were
nested (see below for more explanation), using the R anova function
with the Chi-square test. In models for cultivation, where multiple le-
vels of contract were included, level of contract was added as a pre-
dictor. However, here, motivations were non-randomly distributed
between levels and therefore analysis was split between using level-
only, and motivations-only, as predictor. The two were subsequently
compared using AIC and the model with the lower score was selected
for further testing.
2.5.3. Model Building and Evaluation
The best-performing basic model (whether using all motivations to
join as independent predictors [ALL], collapsing all motivations to join
into one factor with all unique combinations of motivations across the
respondents [MULT], or using top motivation only [TOP]) was identi-
ﬁed using AIC. As long as this model was signiﬁcantly better performing
than the null (intercept-only) model, we built on this by testing whether
adding any of the other predictors (e.g. adding top reasons [TOP] to a
model based on incorporating all reasons to join as independent pre-
dictors [ALL]) resulted in a signiﬁcantly better model. The best model,
therefore, could be any one of the basic models, or a combination.
The coeﬃcients between individual factor levels were compared for
signiﬁcance using the glht function in package multcomp (Hothorn
et al., 2008). We applied Tukey's test for all-pair comparisons and sig-
niﬁcant contrasts (p < 0.05) were interpreted as indicating negative vs
positive relationships with the response. For convenience, all p values
from glht tests are indicated as pglht. glht was also used to evaluate
diﬀerences in odds of response between factor levels (motivation x is n
times more likely to lead to outcome z than motivation y).
Eﬀect sizes of signiﬁcant predictors were approximated with simple
Chi-square tests where appropriate (in our case, how many contracts
were more or less likely to have a selected outcome given a motivation).
Chi-square test results were retained where p < 0.05 (Table C.1).
Model performance in classiﬁcation, reﬂecting the adequacy of the
predictors in informing the outcome (Faraway, 2006) was tested by
using the proportion of 1 s in the model data frame as a threshold above
which a predicted response probability would be classed as a 1 (sui-
table, compliant, additional), and under and equal to which a predicted
response would be classed as a 0 (unsuitable, noncompliant, nonaddi-
tional). Overall classiﬁcation strength was computed as % correctly
classiﬁed 0 s and 1 s in the model data frame, 1 classiﬁcation strength as
% correctly classiﬁed 1 s out of all real 1 s, and 0 classiﬁcation strength
as % correctly classiﬁed 0 s out of all real 0 s (Table C.2).
All analysis was undertaken using R version 3.4.1 (R Core Team,
2017). R code and data are available at https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.
ﬁgshare.5977720.
3. Results
3.1. Summary Statistics of Reported Motivation to Join the Programme and
the Way in Which the Incentives Were Used
The most popular motivation for joining the programme was the
P. Bottazzi et al. Ecological Economics 150 (2018) 11–23
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anticipation of the payments (Fig. 4); suggesting the direct incentives
played an important role in motivating farmers to join the programme.
However for 25% of participants, pro-nature instrumental reasons were
their top motivation for participating in the programme (and 50% of
respondents reported this as one of their motivations).
What farmers select from the incentives oﬀered also tells us some-
thing about their motivations. Farmers were free to select multiple in-
centives among a set of ﬁve categories: bee-keeping materials; water
infrastructure (irrigation tanks or tubing); construction material (ce-
ment, tin rooﬁng); fruit trees; or barbed wire. The most popular pre-
ference by far was for barbed wire; chosen by 79% of households (Table
B.1). Households used the barbed wire in diﬀerent ways (Table B.2) but
home and property improvement (50%) was the most common appli-
cation, closely followed by protecting water resources by fencing out
cattle (48%). Only 10% reported doing nothing with the material they
received. Putting barbed wire to use requires signiﬁcant eﬀort in terms
of labour; key informant interviews suggest that< 25% of the cost of
implementing 100m of barbed wire is the cost of the wire itself
meaning farmers incurred a signiﬁcant personal cost by selecting
barbed wire and using it to protect water resources (see Fig. B.1).
3.2. The Proportion of Contracts Representing Additional Conservation, and
Likely Permanence of the Conservation Incentivized
Not all land enrolled in the Watershared programme was considered
suitable by farmers for the activities (cattle grazing or cultivation of
crops) which the programme was aiming to reduce (Fig. 5). Such un-
suitable land, which cannot contribute to achieving the conservation
objectives of the programme, represents 28% of contracts to exclude
cattle (representing 30% by area), and 32% of contracts to prevent
cultivation across all levels (18% by land area). Where suitable land is
enrolled but the terms of the contracts are not complied with, con-
servation objectives also cannot be met; non-compliance occurred in
8% of contracts to exclude cattle (9% by area), and in 16% of contracts
to prevent cultivation (28% by land). Households may have enrolled
suitable land and complied with the contract, but they would not have
carried out the activity the programme aimed to reduce on that land
anyway (for example because they have enough land for their pro-
duction needs). Such non-additional conservation occurred in 25% of
contracts to exclude cattle (30% by area), and in 39% of contracts to
prevent cultivation (42% by area). The most important additionality
category from the perspective of eﬀective conservation is ‘additional’
(i.e. conservation which wouldn't have happened in the absence of the
programme). Our estimates suggest that 39% of contracts to exclude
cattle (31% by area), and 14% of contracts to prevent cultivation (13%
by area), represent additional conservation. Summing across both
conservation targets (excluding cattle and preventing cultivation)
suggests that 22% of contracts (representing 13% of the area under
contracts) represent additional conservation (see Fig. 5).
The permanence of the conservation incentivized by the programme
beyond the time when contracts expire is not possible to assess com-
pletely due to missing data (Fig. 6). Out of those who responded,>
60% intend to continue conservation either through not grazing cattle
on level 1 land, or through not cultivating land in any contract level.
However, the proportion continuing conservation is not equally dis-
tributed across all additionality categories. Conservation is less likely to
be continued on contracts which were additional than other categories
(apart from non-compliant where we expect a very low proportion to
continue conservation as they have already broken the terms). This
makes sense as to be classed as additional, the contract must be land
which the household would use for the activity the programme seeks to
disincentivize. For only 30% of contracts classiﬁed as providing addi-
tional conservation in terms of excluding cattle (32% for contracts
preventing deforestation) do farmers suggest they would continue in
the absence of the payments.
3.3. The Extent to Which Motivation to Join the Programme Inﬂuences the
Additionality of Contracts
Model performance was acceptable considering the noise inherent
in summarising social, multiple-answer data. However, misclassiﬁca-
tion was common in all models and eﬀect sizes were quite small (Tables
C.1, C.2). The extent to which each of the four categories of motivation
to join the programme (payment, social, pro-nature instrumental and
pro-nature non-instrument) positively or negatively predicts the suit-
ability of land enrolled by households, compliance with the terms of the
contract, or the additionality of conservation funded on that land is
summarised in Fig. 7.
3.3.1. Predicting the Extent to Which Households Enrol Suitable Land in the
Programme
Suitability of parcels for both cultivation and grazing was predicted
by a presence of pro-nature instrumental motivations and absence of
pro-nature non-instrumental motivations (Fig. 7; pglht = 0.0077,
pglht = 0.0015, respectively). The odds of suitable land being enrolled
by people with pro-nature instrumental motivations were 2.4× (for
cultivation) and 4× (for grazing) higher than pro-nature non-instru-
mental motivations, respectively. In the case of cultivation, the like-
lihood that suitable land was enrolled in the programme depended on
level of contract and were lowest for level 1 contracts (2 vs 1
pglht = 0.007, 3 vs 1 pglht < 0.001, 3 vs 2 pglht = 0.011). The odds of
enrolled land being suitable were ca 4× and 2× higher for level 3 than
levels 1 and 2, respectively.
Fig. 4. Distribution of households' (n=507)
top motivation to join the programme and
motivations reported when given the opportu-
nity for multiple answers (sums to> 100%).
Classiﬁcation of motivations is: pro-nature non-
instrumental , pro-nature instrumental ,
social and payment (see Fig. 1).
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3.3.2. Predicting the Extent to Which Households Comply With the Contract
on Land They Enrol
Households where the respondent reported being motivated to join
the programme by the payments were less likely to comply with the
requirement to keep cattle out of their level 1 land (Fig. 7; p=0.012).
The top performing model predicting compliance with the requirement
not to cultivate included only the level of the contract (Fig. 7). Com-
pliance was higher on level 1 contracts than levels 2 and 3
(pglht < 0.001; levels 2&3 were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent to each
other). However this model using level as the predictor of compliance
only slightly outperformed the model based on motivations to join the
programme (square brackets Fig. 7) which suggested that the odds of
being compliant are 2× higher for those motivated by pro-nature in-
strumental motivations than by payments (pglht = 0.034).
3.3.3. Predicting the Extent to Which Parcels Enrolled in Contracts
Represents Additional Conservation
The motivations of those whose contracted land represents additional
conservation was diﬀerent for contracts classed as additional in terms of
excluding cattle, and preventing cultivation (Fig. 7). For cattle, the odds
Fig. 5. The distribution of additionality categories by contract levels is shown by number of contracts (A) and land area (B). The width of the columns represents the
relative number (A) or area (B) in each contract level. Data for level 1 contracts is presented separately for exclusion of cattle grazing and cultivation of crops. The
distribution of additionality categories by both number and land area for contracts aiming to prevent cultivation summed across all levels (C), and all contracts
combined (D) are also shown. ⁎Not all level 3 contracts were included in the survey, therefore the true number and land area of level 3 contracts is higher.
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of contracts being additional were 8× higher when both the payments
and pro-nature instrumental motivations were the reasons for joining the
programme rather than pro-nature non-instrumental motivations
(pglht= 0.013). We had data on motivations from a separate question
(why did you choose this level of contract). When we used motivations
from this question in our additionality model, the same results emerged,
suggesting the pattern is clear with regards to conservation from cattle
(see Appendix D). For cultivation, only pro-nature non-instrumental
motivations were signiﬁcant (p=0.013), and, in contrast to the results
for cattle, pro-nature non-instrumental motivations increased the prob-
ability that land enrolled represented additional conservation.
4. Discussion
4.1. What Motivates Participation in the Watershared Programme?
Analysing people's motivation to do something is always challen-
ging as people may not be willing to share their motivations, they may
not have a full understanding of their own motivations (Helm, 2007),
and of course motivations are seldom simple but result from a combi-
nation of complementary interests (Bremer et al., 2014; Figueroa et al.,
2016). In this paper we use both self-reported motivations and evidence
from what in-kind incentives households select, to piece together peo-
ple's motivation for participating in the Watershared programme and
implementing the environmental behaviour it seeks to incentivize: not
converting forest land to cultivation and preventing cattle from grazing
in riparian forests.
Many studies have found that motivations in PES programme do not
come directly from the material incentives (Figueroa et al., 2016;
Hayes, 2012; Rode et al., 2015; Van Hecken and Bastianensen, 2010).
Several strands of evidence suggest that farmers' decisions to enrol land
in the Watershared programme is not driven exclusively, or even pri-
marily, by the direct incentives provided by the programme. Firstly,
while 76% of respondents mention the payments as one of the reasons
they joined the programme,< 50% give this as the top reason. The
compensation provided is also of relatively low value; only $10 a
Fig. 6. Respondents' plans for future use of contracted land presented by additionality class, and classiﬁed into continuing conservation, stopping conservation and
unknown. Contracts concerned with preventing cultivation (B) have an additional category which represents putting cattle on level 2 or 3 land (as this is not against
the terms of the contract). The width of the bars represents the proportion of contracts in each additionality category.
Fig. 7. Results for the selected models exploring the predictors
of contracts being suitable (suitable land rather than unsuitable
land enrolled), compliant (terms of the contract being followed
or not), or additional (would have been conserved anyway in the
absence of the programme or not) for both contracts to exclude
cattle ( ) and prevent cultivation ( ). Signiﬁcant predictors
are entered in as + (positively associated with outcome), −
(negatively associated with outcome), < /> (less or more likely
to be associated with the outcome). Square brackets around±
indicate alternative model's results (see text for details).
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hectare plus a one oﬀ payment of $100 for joining the programme for
the highest level (level 1). According to estimates from our interviews
in the area, annual crops production can produce as much as $1000/ha
(although this is a gross ﬁgure not accounting for inputs such as labour
and of course not all land is suitable for annual crops).
Nearly a quarter of participants gave pro-social motivations as one
of the reasons to participate (and 14% gave it as their top reason).
Speciﬁc examples of pro-social motivations mentioned include access to
training, networking and recognition by the community. A study in
Nicaragua found that knowledge exchange with other farmers was a
major motivation for participation in a PES programme (Van Hecken
and Bastianensen, 2010), however in our case, social motivations
seemed less important, as they were the least frequent reason for
joining and also did not contribute to conservation outcomes.
It is clear that what Rode et al. (2015) has classiﬁed as pro-nature
motivations play a signiﬁcant role in motivating participants in the
Watershared programme. There is a strong narrative in farmers' justiﬁ-
cations for their engagement in the programme that instrumental values
of nature (speciﬁcally conserving water used by themselves and their
community) play a signiﬁcant role in motivating participation in the
Watershared programme. Twenty ﬁve percent of farmers gave pro-
nature instrumental motivations as their top reason for joining the
programme (50% mentioned it as one of their motivations). Looking at
what incentives farmers selected, and how they choose to implement it,
also supports interview responses that pro-nature instrumental moti-
vations were important to farmers.
The popularity of barbed wire (which was chosen by 79% of
households) is likely to be at least partly because fencing is seen as a
way of securing or strengthening property rights. In fact 50% of
households reported using barbed wire to secure their property.
Property rights in this region of Bolivia are somewhat informal and
many people do not have clearly registered land title (Bottazzi and Rist,
2012) so fencing parcels of land can emphasise or legitimize a claim.
There are a number of other examples showing how PES contracts can
be used locally to support property rights (Bremer et al., 2014; Kosoy
et al., 2008). This motivation is likely to be behind the selection of
barbed wire by many households but a similar percentage reported
using barbed wire speciﬁcally to exclude cattle from riparian forests
(rather than using it elsewhere on their farms). Perceived beneﬁts in
terms of water quality seem likely to be the most important motivation
for this. The choice of barbed wire, and such a high proportion using it
to fence their contracted areas along rivers therefore supports ques-
tionnaire responses that signiﬁcant proportions of households are en-
gaged due to instrumental values of nature.
There are signiﬁcant issues with water quality in the area as water
sources are mostly unimproved and there is a strong perception (like in
many Latin America rural areas; Kosoy et al., 2007) that forest con-
servation contributes to water quality. In the study area, the long his-
tory of NGO activity in the area promoting a link between water quality
and management of upland forests (Robertson and Wunder, 2005) may
contribute to this perception. There may also be local ecological
knowledge underpinning this perceived link as Bolivian indigenous
people, as well as farmer societies more widely, have developed a ﬁne-
tuned understanding of their environment (Boillat and Berkes, 2013).
4.2. Has the Programme Provided Additional Conservation?
The problem of ensuring that PES pays for additional conservation
(which would not have occurred in the absence of the programme) has
been a challenge since the concept was ﬁrst developed. For example,
the well-known Costa Rican PES programme designed to reduce de-
forestation did not result in additional conservation as the majority of
farmers who enrolled land were those who would not have converted
their land anyway (Pattanayak et al., 2010; Sánchez-Azofeifa et al.,
2007). A number of studies have similarly demonstrated that farmers
with a high proportion of uncultivable land, and therefore a low
opportunity cost of conservation, are more willing to join PES pro-
grammes (Arriagada et al., 2009; Figueroa et al., 2016).
The majority of the conservation funded by Watershared is not ad-
ditional. Firstly, farmers enrol land they know to be unsuitable for the
activity the programme aims to prevent; such conservation is not ad-
ditional, as the land would not have been converted even in the absence
of the incentives. Secondly, a portion of contracts are non-compliant
meaning that the terms of the contract are not followed. Thirdly, for a
further proportion farmers admit they would not have cultivated or put
cattle on the land even in the absence of the contract (perhaps because
they did not currently need the land); such contracts also cannot re-
present additional conservation. However, where these categories are
removed, 22% of all contracts (13% by area) may represent additional
conservation. This ﬁgure of potentially additional conservation is
higher when just the contracts to exclude cattle are considered (39% of
contracts, 31% by land area). Very few studies provide estimates of the
extent to which PES funds additional conservation. Our ﬁndings are
somewhat comparable to ﬁndings from a Mexican forest conservation
PES programme which concluded 12–15% of funded conservation was
additional (Costedoat et al., 2015) but suggest somewhat higher rates of
additionality overall.
4.3. Is There a Link Between a Farmer's Motivation to Join the Programme
and Additionality of Conservation Funded?
It is well understood that people are driven by diﬀerent motivations
to join environmental programmes including PES (Bremer et al., 2014;
Fisher, 2012; Kosoy et al., 2008). It is therefore interesting to know the
extent to which those driven by diﬀerent motivations contribute dif-
ferently to outcomes. Our models suggest that motivation is an im-
portant predictor of behaviour when it comes to engagement with a PES
programme. Those motivated to join the programme by pro-nature
instrumental values are more likely to enrol suitable land. There is
evidence that contracts are more likely to represent additional con-
servation in terms of keeping cattle out of riparian forests when en-
rolled by farmers motivated by pro-nature instrumental values of
nature. This eﬀect is not seen for the additionality of contracts pre-
venting cultivation in forest. In this case, motivations based on pro-
nature non-instrumental values (reﬂecting existence values, or moral
values) are the most important predictors of contracts representing
additional conservation. This may be because the instrumental value of
keeping cattle out of rivers (in terms of impacts on water quality) is
widely understood in the area, while any link between clearance of
forest and locally valued environmental services is more tenuous.
Interestingly, those motivated by payments, while likely to commit
suitable land, were particularly unlikely to comply with the terms of the
contract.
4.4. How Permanent is the Conservation Likely to be?
PES programmes may achieve additional conservation outcomes
while in operation but these might disappear once incentives are dis-
continued (Engel et al., 2008). This is especially likely to be the case
where continued eﬀort is required from a landowner to sustain con-
servation, or high demand to use conserved land exists (Engel et al.,
2008; Wunder et al., 2008). Pagiola et al. (2016) found that con-
servation beneﬁts in a Colombian silvopastoral project were retained
after payments ended; however the programme was incentivizing
farmers to switch to more productive practices. It is unrealistic to ex-
pect truly additional use-restricting conservation activities to persist
when payments end (Börner et al., 2017).
The answers landowners gave to our questions on future land use
showed that a signiﬁcant proportion of respondents already plan to
cease conservation eﬀorts when the programme ends. Unfortunately,
this is particularly true for the most valuable cases (where conservation
is likely to be additional). This is unsurprising as to be classiﬁed as
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additional, the farmer must have responded that they would have used
the land in the absence of the programme. It is perhaps therefore to be
expected that such land would be some of the most likely to later be
converted when the payments cease.
There is a strong and growing literature about the extent to which
using direct incentives to promote pro-environmental behaviours can
undermine (crowd-out) or reinforce (crowd-in) intrinsic motivations for
those behaviours (Rode et al., 2015; Moros et al., 2017). Crowding-out
means that a PES programme has the potential to do more harm than
good if pre-existing motivations to conserve are reduced by the
monetary incentive, and the incentive cannot be continued (Chervier
et al., 2017). In our study, contracts that were classiﬁed as additional
but where land owners report that they will continue conservation
could represent examples of ‘crowding in’ of intrinsic motivations to
conserve (as farmers initially planned to use the land but after engaging
in the PES programme they are considering keeping their land under
conservation long term). On the other hand, the proportion that was
categorized as non-additional but where they now say they would stop
conservation after the contract could reﬂect ‘crowding-out’. Both phe-
nomena are seen in our data. However this is not ﬁrm evidence of
motivational crowding as circumstances may have changed meaning
that the suitability of land and future plans for land have changed since
land was enrolled.
4.5. Characterising the Watershared PES Programme
Since Wunder published a simple deﬁnition more than a decade ago
(Wunder, 2015) there has been extensive debate about the distin-
guishing characteristics of PES (Muradian et al., 2010; Sommerville
et al., 2009; van Noordwijk et al., 2012). Muradian et al. (2010) provide
a particularly helpful framework for categorising PES programmes
based on 1) the importance of the economic incentive, 2) the directness
of the transfer and 3) the degree of commodiﬁcation. We use this fra-
mework to analyse Watershared. Firstly the economic incentives oﬀered
in Watershared are not tied to opportunity costs (Asquith, 2016) and
while many participants report the payments play a role in motivating
participation, this is certainly not the only motivation (our data). We
therefore suggest the importance of the incentive is medium. The
funding is from a combination of local government, charges on water
bills, and international donors, meaning the transfer is quite direct. The
degree of commodiﬁcation is, as in many programmes (Corbera et al.,
2009), quite low as it is based on assumptions about the relationship
between land use and the provision of ecosystem services developed
initially with limited empirical evidence (Pynegar, 2018).
In 2015 Wunder provided an updated deﬁnition of PES: “voluntary
transactions between service users and service providers conditional on
agreed rules of natural resource management for generating oﬀsite
services”.Watershared has always avoided the terminology of PES when
discussing the programme in Bolivia (Asquith, 2016). This is because
they associate the term with a stark, market-based neoclassical eco-
nomics deﬁnition of PES while Watershared emphasises reciprocity and
beneﬁt-sharing between community members (N. Asquith pers. com).
However Watershared does indeed meet the updated Wunder (2015)
deﬁnition as enrolment of land by farmers is voluntary, the incentives
are provided conditional on farmers following the rules of the pro-
gramme, and these rules are intended to generate oﬀsite beneﬁts (in
terms of downstream water supply, carbon sequestration and biodi-
versity).
4.6. Introducing the Concept of ‘Payment for Environmental Self-Service’
While Watershared meets the widely used deﬁnition of a PES pro-
gramme; we feel it is important to emphasise the role that pro-nature
instrumental motivations play in decisions to participate in the
programme. We have demonstrated this based on both farmers' re-
ported motivations to join the programme and their choice of incentives
when oﬀered a range of valuable materials. We coin the term ‘payments
of environmental self-service’ to describe this situation where the ex-
ternal incentive enables changes in behaviour at least partly motivated
by the environmental service beneﬁts the provider receives. This
challenges the view that the service ‘user’ and ‘provider’ in a PES pro-
gramme are necessarily wholly separate. In the case of Watershared, the
motivation of up-stream users to conserve the watershed for their own
water needs also contributes to them being willing to make the changes
required by the programme. The incentives are therefore enabling a
change compatible with existing motivations based on farmers' under-
standing of linkages between excluding cattle and the valued ecosystem
service of clean drinking water. This may explain why the programme
delivers additional conservation, even though it does not cover the
opportunity costs of the changes it incentivizes.
Research on the role of existing motivations in decisions to parti-
cipate in PES programme is advancing rapidly; with a recent evidence
from framed ﬁeld experiments (Handberg and Angelsen, 2016; Moros
et al., 2017), and quasi-experimental approaches (Chervier et al.,
2017). Careful consideration is needed to ensure that clumsy design of
PES does not result in crowding-out of intrinsic motivations and a net
reduction in pro-environmental behaviour.
5. Conclusion
The additionality of conservation funded by PES programmes has
attracted a lot of attention as it is a key component of PES eﬀectiveness.
Like many PES programmes, Watershared is providing funding to con-
serve areas where no changes in management are occurring as a result
of the programme. However, we show that the programme does also
appear to result in conservation which is truly additional. Most inter-
estingly, we have demonstrated that the motivations of farmers to join
the programme matter as these are important predictors of the extent to
which contracts represent additional conservation. Using both ques-
tionnaire responses, and considerations of what farmers choose from a
list of possible incentives on oﬀer, we conclude that the additional
conservation achieved does not arise because the programme pays the
opportunity cost of conservation, but because it builds on existing en-
vironmental motivations and facilitates farmers to make changes that
they are already motivated to make. It is important to note that despite
these intrinsic motivations playing a role, the permanence of the
changes incentivized does depend on the continuation of the pro-
gramme. As the number of PES-like initiatives continues to grow, un-
derstanding what predicts eﬀectiveness becomes ever more important
(Börner et al., 2017). We hope that these ﬁndings will encourage those
implementing PES programmes to carefully consider local motivations,
and capitalize on opportunities to promote potential environmental
‘self-service’ beneﬁts from a programme.
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Appendix A. Description of Watershared Contracts
Table A.1
Descriptions of the 3 types of contract in the Watershared payment for watershed services programme implemented by Natura Foundation Bolivia in
the Bolivian highlands.
Level Type of land Agriculture
permitted?
Timber extraction
permitted?
Cattle rearing
permitted?
Payment on signing
(US$)
Annual payment
(per ha)
1 Forested within 100 of a
stream
No No No 100 10
2 Forested within 100 of a
stream
No No Phased reduction 0 3
3 Forested, shrub or forested
pasture
No No Yes 0 1
Appendix B. Summary Information About Uptake of Incentives, and the Application of Barbed Wire by Households
Table B.1
Distribution of ﬁrst (preferred) choice of incentives over two rounds of selecting
incentives from theWatershared programme; totals add up to> 100% due to one
households potentially selecting two diﬀerent preferences across the rounds.
Number Percent Incentive
399 79 Barbed wire
162 32 Fruit trees
81 16 Cement
45 9 Polytube
11 2 Bee box
8 2 Other
Table B.2
Respondents' use of barbed wire requested from the programme (NB 79% selected barbed wire-see Table B.1). %= total number of choices across 2
rounds of being oﬀered and selecting incentives from the Watershared programme.
Nothing Protecting forest Home and property improvement Protecting water
10% 10% 50% 48%
Fig. B.1. The approximate distribution in terms of investment in US$ terms for implementing 100m of barbed wire for fencing land to exclude cattle. Only 23% of
the value of the investment comes from the programme (in terms of the wire provided), the rest is provided by the farmer in terms of sourcing staples, poles and
providing labour. This estimate is based on key informant interviews with 10 farmers and Natura technicians.
Appendix C. Model Performance Summaries
Table C.1
Chi-square tests showing signiﬁcant (p < 0.05) numbers of cases being more or less than the expected number for a given outcome.
Category Model outcome Motivation/level Observed Expected Diﬀerence
Cattle Suitable Non-instrumental 18 27 −9
Cattle Suitable Instrumental 102 92 10
Cattle Additional Non-instrumental 4 12 −8
Cattle Additional Instrumental+ ﬁnancial 69 62 7
(continued on next page)
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Table C.1 (continued)
Category Model outcome Motivation/level Observed Expected Diﬀerence
Crops Suitable Level 1 234 291 −57
Crops Suitable Level 2 73 70 3
Crops Suitable Level 3 315 260 55
Crops Compliant Financial 221 232 −11
Crops Compliant Instrumental 127 115 12
Crops Compliant Level 1 223 180 43
Crops Compliant Level 2+3 255 298 −43
Table C.2
The extent to which models predicting the conservation outcome of contracts result in correct classiﬁcation. “Overall”=correct 0 and 1 out of all
cases. “0”=correct 0 out of all true 0, “1”=correct 1 out of all true 1. 0 across all models stands for negative outcome, i.e. unsuitable,
noncompliant, nonadditional.
Category Model Overall (%) 0 (%) 1 (%)
Cattle Suitability 55 61 53
Cattle Compliance 44 88 38
Cattle Additionality 60 53 64
Crops Suitability 64 69 62
Crops Compliance 57 92 47
Crops Additionality 57 56 61
Appendix D. Description of Extra Additionality Model for Cattle Exclusion
For level 1 contracts, additionality was also modelled against the question “Why did you choose this level”. The question was avoided for
cultivation owing to the considerable diﬀerences between levels in both payments (level 1 > 2 > 3) and land type (proximity to river) which
would confound the answers of households with diﬀerent contracts. However, because level 1 contracts are such a special case, incurring both much
higher payments while subject to more rigorous monitoring, we felt that this particular question might provide more information than using only the
overarching question of why join the programme. No top reason was available for choosing the level, with the exception of which model selection
followed the principles outlined in Methods.
Four motivations were available based on the answers presented as options to the question “Why did you choose this level”: Instrumental, non-
instrumental, payment, and opportunism, the latter which encompassed reasons such as there being no other option, the household only knew this
level, or the level did not involve changing practices. The former had responses very similar to those of joining the programme, namely protecting
water, protecting forest, or payment.
The models MULT and ALL were only 2 AIC apart, MULT performing slightly better. The results of both models indicated a negative relationship
between non-instrumental motivations and additionality. Glht identiﬁed contrasts between payment+ instrumental motivations and non-instru-
mental motivations for MULT (pglht = 0.003), while model summaries (Wald tests) for ALL gave non-instrumental motivations a p value of 0.004
with respect to the arbitrary intercept of no motivations. The performance of MULT gave an overall correct classiﬁcation rate of 54%, correct
classiﬁcation of additional of 42%, and a correct classiﬁcation of non-additionals of 74%.
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